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As will be seen from the foregoing cases, the courts have not re-
garded a cause of action as a fixed and inflexible concept to be applied
inexorably in every instance, but as a concept that can be modified so
as to reach the most desirable result upon the facts before the court.
It is submitted that the concept of a cause of action should not be re-
garded as fixed and unyielding to be applied strictly under all circum-
stances, but as flexible and elastic to be modified so as to achieve the
most desirable results under the facts of the case in question.
ROLAND A. ZACHMAN
ELECTION OF REMEDIES - REPUDIATION OF ELECTION DOC-
TRINE IN AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS - INTERPRETATION
OF SECTION 11363, OHIO GENERAL CODE
Plaintiff recovered judgment in an action for breach of a contract
to deliver certain stock. The case was reversed by the Court of Appeals
and remanded for a new trial. Plaintiff then filed an amended petition
alleging substantially the same set of facts as the original petition, but
added that defendant had failed to perform its agreement to deliver the
stock and that thereafter plaintiff rescinded the contract and demanded
that defendant return the money which had been paid. Defendant filed
a motion to strike the amended petition from the files on the ground
that it set up a different cause of action from that stated in the original
petition. Held, that in the light of all the circumstances, there was no
prejudicial error in overruling the motion, Isaac v. Intercoast Sales
Corp., 132 Ohio St. 289 (1937).
Defendant's contention was that the amended petition represented
a new cause of action and that there had been an election of remedies
by plaintiff when he filed the original petition. The court stated that
the principle running through all of the decisions is toward liberality in
amending pleadings in the furtherance of justice, especially where the
facts are the same and where the amended pleading does not catch the
defendant by surprise. It was pointed out that the prayer and essential
facts of the original and amended petitions were the same, as was the
defense in both trials, namely, that the stock had been delivered by
defendant. Defendant knew that plaintiff wanted his money back for
the reason that he had never received the stock, and plaintiff knew that
the defense of defendant would be that it had delivered the stock. Since
each side knew what the position of the other side was, the court thought
that defendant was not caught by surprise by the filing of the amended
petition.
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It has been generally held that a remedy based upon the theory of
affrmance of a contract or other transaction is inconsistent with a rem-
edy based on the theory of its disaffirmance or rescission, so that the
election of either is an abandonment of the other, Whiteside v. Brawley,
152 Mass. 133, 24 N.E. io88 (189o); Ervine v. Goodman & Co.
Bank, 171 Cal. 559, 153 Pac. 945 (1915); Mintz v. Jacob, 163
Mich. 28o, 128 N.W. 211 (191o). Ohio has indicated that such
remedies are inconsistent, Parmlee v. Adolph, 28 Ohio St. IO (1876);
Frederickson v. Nye, iio Ohio St. 459, 35 A.L.R. 1163, 144 N.E.
299 (1924). The doctrine adopted by the courts has been that, on the
breach of a contract, an election either to sue upon it or to rescind it, if
pursued sufficiently, waives the privilege of asserting the respectively
inconsistent remedy. American Woolen Co. v. Samuelson, 226 N.Y.
61, 123 N.E. 154 (1919); Rasmussen v. Hungerford Potato Growers
/lss'n, iii Neb. 58, 195 N.W. 469 (1923).
The general principles of the doctrine of election of remedies are not
consonant with the theory of the code reform in the furtherance of lib-
erality and simplicity in pleading. The doctrine has been restricted in
its application, and in Ohio, Frederickson v. Nye, supra, has established
a significant limitation upon it. The court there held that an action at
law in deceit averring title in the vendee is inconsistent with an action
in equity to establish a constructive trust averring equitable title in the
vendor, and that the filing of the law action was an irrevocable election
to pursue that remedy. The court said that in order that an election of
one remedial right shall be a bar to the pursuit of another, the same must
be inconsistent and the election made with knowledge and intention and
purpose to elect. The mere bringing of a suit was held not to be de-
terminative of the right, and it was said that the party making the elec-
tion must have received some benefit under the same, or have caused
detriment to the other party, or pursued his remedy to final judgment.
However, as applied to the facts and procedure of the principal case,
the limitation of the Frederickson case would not be sufficiently broad
to shield the plaintiff from the application of the election doctrine, for
the principal case does not go beyond the requirements therein set forth.
The Isaac v. Intercoast Sales Corp. case may be more correctly consid-
ered as a direct repudiation of the doctrine of election of remedies in the
amendment of pleadings where the facts are the same and where the
amended pleading does not catch the defendant by surprise. Viewed in
this manner, the principal case would appear to be a definite restriction
of the application of the election doctrine in this field consonant with
the theory of the codes.
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In the briefs of both appellant and appellee before the Supreme
Court in the instant case, argument was made upon Section 11363,
Ohio Gen. Code, which is as follows: "Before or after judgment, in
furtherance of justice and on such terms as it deems proper, the court
may amend any pleading, process, or proceeding, by adding or striking
out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a
party or a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other allegations
material to the case, or, when the amendment does not substantially
change the claim or defense by conforming the pleading or proceeding
to the facts proved." The language which reads: "When the amend-
ment does not substantially change the claim or defense" has been inter-
preted consistently by the courts as qualifying each instance before-
mentioned in the statute wherein amendment is permitted. The Ohio
courts have thus indicated that despite the enumeration in the statute of
the instances wherein amendment may be permitted in the exercise of
a wide discretion, yet the statute does not authorize any amendment
which substantially changes the plaintiff's claim or defense. Both appel-
lant and appellee recognized such interpretation in their briefs and Ohio
Electric Railway Co. v. U. S. Express Co., 105 Ohio St. 331, 137
N.E. I (1922), was cited, in which the Supreme Court spoke in sylla-
bus to that effect.
It is respectfully submitted that such a limiting interpretation of the
clause before-mentioned as a blanket restriction upon the methods of
amendment provided for by Section 11363 is unwarranted either from
the standpoint of the purpose of the statute in the code reform of Ohio
or by a consideration of the logical meaning to be gathered from an
examination of the syntax of that section. A perusal of the language
"or, when the amendment does not substantially change the claim or
defense, by conforming the pleading or proceeding to the facts proved"
indicates that the restriction therein contained is itself limited to amend-
ment after verdict or at least to amendment during trial. It is stated
that amendment should be made after verdict or after proof was made
only when such amendment did not change the claim or defense. It
was not said that an amendment should be made only when it did not
change the claim or defense, and to interpret the language in that man-
ner is highly inconsistent with the theory of the section. One of the
principal objectives of the code reform has been the achievement of
liberality and elasticity in pleading and the framers of this statute un-
doubtedly designed it to provide for more or less free amendment as a
step towards the attainment of that objective. It is unfortunate that the
statute has received an interpretation subversive of the very purpose for
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which it was passed, as has so often happened because of the reluctance
of the courts to swing away from preconceived formal standards.
The opinion of the instant case makes no mention of Sec. 11363
nor does it expressly indicate a different interpretation from that which
has prevailed. However, the liberal and progressive attitude taken by
the court in repudiating the doctrine of election of remedies in this field
is indicative of a point of view with which the more liberal interpretation
of the statute would be entirely consistent. And the result is encourag-
ing, for an amendment is permitted here which has been considered as
a substantial change in a claim. Here the judgment was reversed and
so the facts cannot be taken as proved. Therefore this case is not within
the limitation of the before-mentioned clause in the section, and the
decision of the court in permitting the amendment is consistent with a
logical construction of the statute and is especially desirable as a step
toward the development of a field of free amendment and wide
discretion.
The court in the principal case in permitting amendment from the
theory of breach to that of rescission treats the factual set-up as one
constituting a single cause of action and repudiates the old concept that
rescission wipes out the contract completely, revealing a tendency to
examine such problems factually rather than legalistically. Where the
facts are the same the court seems to think that the slight divergency in
the prayer of the amended petition, the mere difference in theory be-
tween demanding the return of the money paid and demanding damages
for breach of the agreement, should not preclude the amendment of the
petition. The court believes that the mere shifting to the theory of
rescission should not keep the plaintiff from so amending, especially
where it is apparent that defendant is in no way prejudiced since he well
knows the plaintiff's grounds for recovery and since his defense would
be the same in either case. The solution reached by the court would
seem to be a highly desirable one in the interests of liberality in the
amendment of pleadings and in the furtherance of justice.
CHARLES L. GRAMLICH
